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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GROVE L. FLOWER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930566-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995), whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other
than a first degree felony or capital felony.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of relevant statutes, rules and constitutional
provisions are contained in Addendum A:
Utah Const, art. I, § 14
U.S. Const, amend. IV

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err in concluding that the State had
met its burden of showing that Defendant/Appellant Grove L.
Flower ("Flower") voluntarily consented to a search of the safe
and that such consent was sufficiently attenuated from the
illegal search?

Standard of Review: This issue involves the "third
category" of questions presented for review as outlined in State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1993). Resolution of the issue
involves the "application of law to fact." id. The standard of
review to be applied to the trial court's determination "is a
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for
correctness." Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. A trial court's decision
is given very little deference where the issue involves "consent
to a search that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment."
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938, citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,
1256-71 (Utah 1993). In other words, the trial judge's "pasture"
is narrowed considerably when reviewing a consent issue, id.
Any factual findings underlying the voluntariness and attenuation
conclusions are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of
review. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271.

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
On December 17, 1992, Flower moved the trial court to
suppress all evidence seized from Flower's home and person on the
grounds that the arresting Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P")
agents had violated Flower's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.

R. 22-23.

The trial court suppressed all evidence except for the
contents of the safe located in Flower's bedroom.
312.

R. 77, 301-04,

Flower thereafter entered a conditional plea of guilty

pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), on
August 5, 1993.

R. 102, 105, 337-52.

Pursuant to that plea,

Flower explicitly preserved for appeal the adverse ruling on his
motion to suppress the contents of the safe.

Flower filed a

timely Notice of Appeal with the Third Judicial District Court

2

of Salt Lake County on August 31, 1993.

R. 114-15.x

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as
amended). 2
On December 17, 1992, Flower moved the trial court to
suppress all evidence seized from Flower's home and person on the
grounds that the arresting AP&P agents had violated Appellant's
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States

1

Flower retained Robert B. Breeze as his trial counsel. On
April 3, 1995, the district court judge determined that Flower was
impecunious and appointed Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to
represent Flower on his appeal to this Court. R. 3 62-65. Current
appellate counsel files this replacement opening brief pursuant to
stipulation of the parties and order of this Court.
2

Flower was originally charged by a three-count Information:
Count I, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent
to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (1953 as amended); Count II, Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1953 as amended);
Count III, Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503
(1953 as amended). R. 8-10.
After a preliminary hearing, Flower was bound over to the
district court on Counts I and II; Count III was dismissed.
R. 2-6.
Flower was subsequently charged by the United States
Attorney's Office in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, Central Division, with Possession of a Firearm by
a Convicted Felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Count I of
the Information was dismissed as part of Flower's plea agreement.
R. 103.
3

Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
R. 22-23.
The motion to suppress hearing was held on March 3 0-31,
1993.

The trial court partially granted Flower's motion to

suppress by ordering that the scales and marijuana fragments
found during the protective sweep be suppressed; the marijuana
found in the lunch box be suppressed; the firearms, marijuana,
psilocybin mushrooms, money, and ledger found in the safe not be
suppressed.

R. 77, 301-03, 312.

On April 29, 1993, following the suppression hearing, the
trial judge signed Flower's proposed written findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

R. 82-90.

After the State objected to

Flower's findings, the court held a hearing on July 19, 1993.
The court stated that it had inadvertently signed Flower's
findings and therefore set the previously signed findings of fact
and conclusions of law aside and ordered counsel for the State to
prepare new findings of fact and conclusions of law.

R. 333-

336.3
Thereafter, on August 5, 1993, Flower entered a
conditional plea of guilty to Possession of a Controlled
Substance (i.e. psilocybin mushrooms).

R. 102-03, 105, 337-52.

The court sentenced Flower on August 5, 1993 to the Utah State

3

The new findings of fact and conclusions of law were signed
by the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, on March 14, 1994 and filed
with the district court on April 1, 1994.
R. 307-311.
See
Addendum B.

4

Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years; the court
stayed the execution of the prison sentence and placed Flower on
court probation for three years to run concurrently with his
federal sentence.

R. 112-13, 352-56.4

On August 31, 1993, Flower filed a timely Notice of
Appeal.

R. 114.

On January 10, 1994, this Court remanded the

case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

R. 118C-118F.

A copy of the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law is contained in Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the morning of September 14, 1992, AP&P Agent Arthur
Street received a complaint regarding a possible sexual assault
by a parolee named Kevin Kelly, also known as "Spider."

R. 206.

Agent Street contacted Kelly's parole officer, Agent Steven
Metcalf.

The two agents then went to Kelly's home to investigate

the alleged assault.

R. 207-08, 249.

Agents Street and Metcalf

asked Kelly's former parole officers, Agents Hank Haurand and
Karl Kennington, to accompany them to Kelly's residence.

R. 127,

171.5
4

Flower was convicted after a jury trial in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division,
for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).
The court sentenced Flower to
thirty months in prison followed by a three-year term of supervised
release.
5

Mr. Kelly had reported to the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole that he resided with his wife at 4256 South 4940 West in
West Valley City. R. 208, 249. However, it was later discovered
5

At approximately 2:30 p.m. on September 14, 1992, the
four AP&P agents arrived at 4256 South 4940 West in West Valley
City.

R. 191, 193, 231.

Upon arrival, the agents divided up,

with Agents Street and Metcalf going to the front of the
residence and Agents Kennington and Haurand going around back.
R. 171.

Agents Street and Metcalf knocked on the front door and

received no response.
his pickup truck.

However, within minutes, Kelly arrived in

R. 174, 209.

After the agents identified

themselves and the purpose for their visit, Kelly asked all of
them to step inside so that they would be out of sight of the
neighbors.

R. 131, 151-52, 174, 209-10, 251.

At that time,

Kelly indicated to the agents that he did not think anyone else
was home.

R. 252.

Upon entering the home, Agents Kennington and Metcalf
accompanied Kelly upstairs while Agents Street and Haurand
proceeded downstairs to conduct a protective sweep.
212, 253.

R. 132, 175,

No agent mentioned any suspicion about the possibility

of someone else being in the house at that time.

R. 135-36, 240.

In fact, there was no discussion between the agents regarding
whether they needed to conduct a protective sweep.

R. 133, 13 5-

36, 140.
The agents entered a downstairs bedroom which belonged to
Appellant Flower.
that room.

R. 53-54, 92.

R. 32-33.

Kelly never used or entered

Agent Haurand did not see scales or

that Mr. Kelly was renting a room at that address which was the
home of Flower. R. 154.
6

residue during the sweep of that bedroom, and Agent Street did
not mention such items during the sweep.

R. 193-97, 218.

protective sweep lasted about ten minutes.

The

R. 193.

Over an hour after the sweep was completed, Agent Street
showed Agent Haurand a set of scales with some marijuana residue
at the base.

Agent Street had found the scales alongside the bed

in the downstairs southeast bedroom.

R. 194-95.

Agent Street

also told Agent Haurand that some marijuana seeds, stems and
residue were on the floor area of the closet immediately in front
of a gun safe.

R. 195, 214-15.

Agent Metcalf later testified

that Agent Street had reported finding "something" fifteen to
twenty minutes after the protective sweep.

R. 270.

After conducting the sweep, the officers questioned Kelly
regarding the occupant of the southeast bedroom.

R. 219.

Kelly

stated that Flower resided in the downstairs southeast corner
bedroom and would be returning from work around 4:30 p.m.
R. 219, 232.

Thereafter, Agent Kennington contacted the County

Attorney's Office to try to obtain a search warrant.

R. 220.

Agents Street and Metcalf were standing on the front
porch of the residence when Flower arrived home with his son at
approximately 5:15 p.m., two hours and thirty-five minutes after
the illegal protective sweep of Flower's home.

R. 222, 258.

The

two agents approached Flower, with Agent Metcalf identifying
himself and the reasons for the AP&P agents' presence.
232, 259.

R. 222,

Agent Metcalf informed Flower that the agents had

found scales, seeds and marijuana residue in his bedroom and then
7

stated, "I would sure like to know what was in that safe."
R. 223, 232-33, 259.

Flower testified that upon being approached

by the agents, he felt like he was not free to leave (R. 288);
the agents confirmed the fact that he could not have just walked
away.

R. 233.
Flower responded to Agent Metcalf s request by saying

something to the effect that there is an eighth ounce of
marijuana and some guns.

R. 222, 259.

Agent Metcalf then asked

Appellant for permission to search inside the safe.
responded by saying, "yeah."

Flower

R. 224, 260.

Agent Metcalf next conducted a frisk of Flower for
weapons.

R. 223, 261.

Flower placed the lunch pail he was

carrying on the hood of the truck by which he was standing.
R. 223, 264.

When Flower's son reached for the lunch pail,

Flower told the boy "no" and moved the lunch pail out of the
child's reach.

R. 224-25, 261-62.

Agent Metcalf picked up the

lunch pail and asked Flower what was inside.
responded, "It's pot, man."

R. 225, 262.

R. 266.

Flower

Agent Metcalf opened

the lunch pail and saw a bag containing approximately one-half
pound of marijuana.

R. 225, 262-63.

Flower was placed under arrest and taken into the home.
R. 225, 263.

When the agents and Flower were in the kitchen,

Agent Street read Flower his Miranda rights.
Flower invoked his right to silence.

R. 226, 263-64.

R. 226, 263-64.

Agent

Street asked Flower if they could still search the safe, and
Flower responded by saying, "yes."
8

R. 142, 226.

Flower, who was

handcuffed behind his back, reached around and partially removed
the keys from his front pocket, at which point Agent Street
further removed and took possession of the keys.

R. 226-27, 230-

31, 265.6
On December 17, 1992, Flower moved the district court to
suppress all evidence seized from Flower's home, safe and person
on the grounds that the arresting AP&P agents had violated
Flower's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
R. 22-23.
At the suppression hearing on March 30-31, 1993, the
district court judge partially granted Flower's motion to
suppress by ordering that the scales and marijuana fragments
found during the protective sweep be suppressed; the marijuana
found in the lunch box be suppressed; the firearms, marijuana,
psilocybin mushrooms, money, and ledger found in the safe not be
suppressed.

R. 77, 301-03, 312.

On March 14, 1994, the district court judge signed the
following conclusions of law:
1. The Court finds that the officers did
not have reasonable suspicion to believe that
there was another individual in the house which
posed a danger to them and therefore the
protective sweep was not justified. The scales

6

Upon searching the safe, Agent Street found two guns, a
small quantity of marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, money, and a
ledger. R. 227-228.
9

and marijuana fragments found during the
protective sweep are suppressed.
2. The officers' search of the
defendant's lunch box was not a valid Terry
search nor was it a valid search incident to
arrest. The contents of the lunch box are
suppressed.
3. The initial consent given by the
defendant to search the safe when he was
contacted in the front yard of the house was
sufficiently attenuated from the protective sweep
and was voluntary. The subsequent consent given
by the defendant after his arrest and after his
Miranda rights had been given to him was
attenuated from the protective sweep and was
voluntary. The search of the safe was a valid
consent search and the contents of the safe are
not suppressed.
R. 310-11.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court incorrectly concluded that the State had
met its burden of showing that Flower voluntarily consented to a
search of the safe and that such consent was sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal sweep and illegal search of the lunch
box.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S CONSENT TO
SEARCH THE SAFE WAS VOLUNTARY AND SUFFICIENTLY
ATTENUATED FROM THE ILLEGALITY.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees every citizen the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
10

Constitution also provides a similar right.7

A search conducted

pursuant to consent is one of the specifically established
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause
requirement.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219

(1973) .

A. FLOWER'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE SAFE WAS NOT
VOLUNTARILY GIVEN.
In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court set out a two-prong test to be used in determining
whether or not a person's consent to search following police
misconduct was lawfully obtained and therefore not violative of
the Fourth Amendment:

(1) The consent must be given voluntarily;

and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police exploitation
of the prior illegality.

Id. at 688; see State v. Thurman, 846

P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 8.2(d) at 190 (2d ed. 1987).
The first prong of the Arroyo test requires that consent
be voluntary in order to be valid.

If the consent is not

voluntary, no further inquiry is required; the evidence is
suppressed.
218.

Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; see Schneckloth, 412 U.S.

"Whether the requisite voluntariness exists depends on 'the

totality of all the surrounding circumstances--both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of7 police
7

Flower does not make a separate argument under Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitut ion but relies solely on the
protection guaranteed him under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
11

conduct."
at 226).

Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S.
Included in the totality of the circumstances are

"subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
It is also well settled that the prosecution bears the
burden of proving that the defendant's consent was voluntary.
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 577 (1980).

The Arroyo court stated

that since consent is an exception to the warrant requirement,
the burden is on the government to show that the search was
voluntary.

In proving the exception, the prosecution has a much

heavier burden to satisfy than when proving consent to search
which does not follow police misconduct.

Id. at 687-688.

In evaluating whether a conclusion of voluntariness
should be overturned on appeal, the reviewing court must engage
in the following analysis to ensure the State has met its burden:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony
that the consent was "unequivocal and specific"
and "freely and intelligently given"; (2) the
government must prove consent was given without
duress or coercion, express or implied; and
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be
convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (quoting United States v.
Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977)).

"In addition,

factors indicating a lack of coercion in obtaining consent are
12

the officer's lack of a claim of authority to search,' 'the
absence of an exhibition of force' by the officer, the officers
'mere request to search,' 'cooperation' by the defendant, and the
officer's lack of 'deception.'"

State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913

(Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106
(Utah 1980)) .
The trial court determined that Flower consented to a
search of the safe.

R. 296, 299, 310.8

The trial court did not

8

The findings and conclusions drafted by the prosecutor
include conclusions that the initial and subsequent consent were
voluntary and attenuated. R. 310. The trial judge did not make
such determinations in his oral ruling. Instead, the trial judge
stated that Flower "gave his consent, after having his rights read
to him, to go into the safe." R. 299. When the prosecutor argued
that an earlier consent had occurred outside, the judge stated,
" [b] ut the critical time is after Miranda. The rights were read to
him and then he consented to the search." R. 296.
In addition, the trial judge apparently disregarded the
attenuation prong. When defense counsel attempted to argue that
the consent was not attenuated from the prior illegality, the trial
judge interrupted, stating:
I don't agree with that philosophy. As heretofore
stated, the defendant in this case gave his
consent, after having his rights read to him, to
go into the safe.
R. 299. This suggests that the trial judge failed to make the
required attenuation analysis even though such a determination
appears in the counsel drafted findings and conclusions.
In his concurring opinion in Automatic Control Products
Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 1263-64 (Utah 1989)
(Zimmerman, J. concurring), Justice Zimmerman indicated that in
some circumstances, counsel drafted findings should be given less
weight than judge drafted findings. Justice Zimmerman recognized
that counsel drafted findings pose a danger that counsel will
"inject findings that may not be entirely in conformity with the
judge's views or that may deal with issues the judge has not even
thought about."
Id.
In the present case, the counsel drafted
findings injected findings such as those criticized by Justice
Zimmerman. The trial judge rejected the initial "consent" as the
13

state on the record nor include in the findings and conclusions
the basis for its legal conclusion.

Nonetheless, under the

circumstances of this case, this Court is in a position to
determine whether the State has met its burden of proof as to
voluntariness.

State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App.

1990) .
A review of the circumstances establishes that the State
failed to meet its burden of showing that Flower voluntarily
consented to a search of the safe.

While in the front yard

immediately after arriving at home, Flower responded that the
officers could search the safe.

R. 222, 258.

Two of the four

AP&P agents who were at Flower's home approached him when he
arrived.

Agent Metcalf immediately informed Flower that they had

found marijuana residue and scales in his bedroom.

R. 223,

basis for his determination and apparently did not conduct an
attenuation analysis.
As Justice Zimmerman further noted in
Automatic Control Products,
11

[F] indings of fact prepared by the court are
'drawn with the insight of a disinterested mind'
and are 'more helpful to the appellate court' than
those prepared by counsel."
United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656, 84
S.Ct. 1044, 1047, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964). It is for
this reason that the federal courts appear to have
almost uniformly adopted the rule that while
findings prepared by counsel are sufficient ... ,
appellate courts 'will feel freer in close cases
to disregard a finding or remand for further
findings if the trial court did not prepare them
him[or her]self.'"
[citations omitted]
Id. at 1264.
In the present case, this Court should feel free to
disregard the counsel drafted conclusions regarding attenuation and
the voluntariness of the initial consent.
14

232-33, 259.

Flower did not feel free to leave.

The agents

confirmed that they would not have permitted Flower to walk away
and that Flower was a suspect.

R. 232, 233, 288.

Agent Metcalf

asked Flower, "I would sure like to know what was in that safe."
R. 223, 232, 259.

Flower responded truthfully by saying that

some marijuana and guns were inside.

R. 222, 259.

Agent Metcalf

asked for permission to search the safe and Flower responded,
"yeah."

R. 224, 260.
This first "consent" was not freely and intelligently

given without any express or implied duress or coercion.

There

was an undue show of authority when Flower arrived home to find
four AP&P agents present.

The ensuing actions and statements by

the officers implied that Flower was a suspect who was in police
custody.

Although the agents did not arrest Flower until after

the illegal search of the lunch pail, Flower was in "custody"
pursuant to the factors outlined in State v. Mirquet, 268 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992) .9 The fact that Flower was in custody
is a relevant factor to be considered in a voluntariness
determination.

Webb, 790 P.2d at 65.

In addition, the failure

to give Miranda warnings prior to this initial request for
9

Factors (2) , (3) and (4) all weigh in favor of a
determination that Flower was in custody. See Mirquet, 268 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 4. The investigation had focused on Flower, and the
objective indicia of arrest were present in that Flower was told
that officers had found illegal contraband in his room and he was
not free to leave. In addition, the form of the interrogation,
where officers initially informed Flower they had found illegal
contraband in this room, shows that he was in custody prior to the
first response that officers could search the safe. The failure of
the agents to Mirandize Flower at this point is also a factor
weighing against the voluntariness of any "consent" to search.
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consent is another factor weighing against the voluntariness of
the consent.

See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App.

1990).
Agent Metcalf's statement that he wanted to know what was
in the safe coupled with other factors including the agent's
failure to inform Flower that he could refuse to consent to a
search, created a coercive atmosphere which would cause any
reasonable person to submit to the officer's show of authority.
See Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 (court considered fact that police
indicated that individual could refuse to consent).
Flower responded that the officers could search the safe
after he was placed under arrest.

The agents took Flower into

the kitchen of his home where they Mirandized him.
64, 276.

R. 225, 263-

Flower immediately invoked his right to silence.

R. 226, 263-64.

After Flower invoked his right to silence, Agent

Street asked Flower "if he was still willing to consent to a
search of that safe."
226.

R. 226.

Flower responded, "yes."

R. 142,

Flower, who was handcuffed behind his back, reached around

and partially removed the keys from his front pocket.

At that

point, Agent Street further removed and took possession of the
R. 226-27, 230-31, 265.10

keys.
10

There was conflicting testimony as to whether Flower or
Agent Street actually removed the keys or whether Agent Street
helped Appellant remove the keys.
The counsel-drafted findings
state that "reached into his pocket to retrieve a key to the safe."
R. 310. However, the trial court judge found at the motion to
suppress hearing that "he [Flower] reached in and got them [the
keys] partially out of his pocket and then they [the agents] got
them the rest of the way out. The officers assisted in taking the
keys out."
R. 296.
This latter finding should control these
16

This second affirmative response to a request to search
the safe did not constitute a voluntary consent to search.

The

agents had officially placed Flower under arrest, handcuffed him
and taken him into the kitchen of his home.

Three of the four

AP&P agents who were at the home were in the kitchen with Flower.
Flower invoked his right to silence.

R. 226.

Flower had already

involuntarily consented to a search of the safe.

His

acquiescence to a search of the safe under these circumstances
did not constitute a voluntary consent to search.
As a parolee who had just been placed under arrest,
Appellant merely acquiesced in the will of the agents.

The State

presented no evidence indicating that Flower was aware of his
right to refuse to consent or that he had any choice other than
to acquiesce.

The agents never asked Flower to sign or read any

type of waiver or consent to search form.

Flower's young child

was present and witnessed at least a portion of the interaction.
The totality of circumstances merely indicates that Flower, a
parolee, was being obedient to four parole officers who waited
over two hours for him to return and who indicated upon Flower's
arrival that they had found scales and drug residue in his room.
The circumstances in this case contrast with the second
consent in Thurman which the Utah Supreme Court concluded was
voluntary.

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273.

The second Thurman

consent was given in a calm atmosphere, "far removed from the

proceedings.
See Automatic Control Products, 780 P. 2d at 1264
(Zimmerman, J. concurring).
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events of that morning."

Id.

Officers gave Thurman the Miranda

warning twice and Thurman agreed to talk with officers, unlike
the current case where Flower exercised his right to silence.
Unlike Flower, Thurman was not in handcuffs, was free to move
around, and opened the combination lock to the storage unit.
Officers used a consent form which they again explained to
Thurman while at the storage unit.

Id.

Thurman did not claim

that his detention was improper.
In the present case, Flower's statements and actions were
"taken in the shadow of authoritative control."

See United

States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977).

The

intimidating atmosphere created by the agents precluded the
consent from being voluntary.

The State did not meet its burden

of establishing under the circumstances of this case that Flower
voluntarily consented to a search of the safe.

B. ANY CONSENT TO SEARCH THE SAFE WAS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE INITIAL
ILLEGALITY.
If a criminal defendant shows that the evidence against
him was obtained through an illegal search or seizure, the
exclusionary rule requires that such evidence be suppressed.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

The exclusionary rule not

only mandates that the illegally obtained evidence be suppressed,
but also that any derivative evidence which was discovered by
exploitation of the prior illegality, i.e. tainted evidence, be
suppressed.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) .
18

"Information gained by law enforcement officers during an
illegal search cannot be used in a derivative manner to obtain
other evidence . . . ."

United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236,

243-44 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974).

"The

Fourth Amendment should not permit law enforcement to 'ratify
their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the
illegality has occurred.'"

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 2363 (citing

Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689).
In order for the government to avoid suppression of the
evidence, it must show that the causal connection between the
police misconduct and the discovery of the derivative evidence
has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."
U.S., 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).

Nardone v.

The court in Arroyo stated:

The basis for the second part of the two-part
analysis is found in the "fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963),
which stated that a trial court must determine in
such a case "'whether, granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.'" (cites omitted) The
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been
extended to invalidate consents which, despite
being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation
of a prior police illegality.
Arroyo at 690.

The Arroyo court adopted the three factors

enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590 (1975), for determining whether there has been sufficient
attenuation to dissipate the taint:

(1) the temporal proximity

between the illegality and the challenged evidence; (2) the
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presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct.
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273-74.

Brown at 603-04; see also

Courts consider the totality of

the circumstances to determine whether the attenuation of the
taint is sufficient to permit the use of the derivative evidence.
U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
The Supreme Court in Sims v. State Tax Com'n., 841 P.2d 6
(Utah 1992), stated that upon considering the Brown factors:
account should also be taken of whether the
illegal seizure brought about police observation
of the particular object they sought consent to
search, whether the consent was volunteered
rather than requested by the detaining officers,
whether the detainee was made aware of the fact
that he could decline to consent and thus prevent
an immediate search, and whether the police
purpose underlying the illegality was to obtain
the consent.
Id. at 10 (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d) at
193-194 (2d ed. 1987)).

In a concurring opinion in Brown,

Justice Powell stated that the exploitation analysis "always
should be conducted with the deterrent purpose of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule sharply in focus."

422 U.S. at 612.

The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the
application of the three-part Thurman attenuation analysis in
State v. Shoulderblade, Case No. 930518 (October 25, 1995) (per
curiam).

In Shoulderblade, the Court recognized that "[a] brief

interval between an improper traffic detention and a consent to
search does not always require suppression."
slip op. at 6 (emphasis in original).

Shoulderblade,

Because it "is generally

desirable and expected" that traffic stops will be brief, relying
20

on temporal proximity alone would "essentially establish a per se
rule excluding all evidence obtained subsequent to an improper
stop."

Id.

Therefore, all three Thurman factors must be

considered.

Although temporal proximity alone does not establish

exploitation, "[a] brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment
violation and consent often indicates exploitation because the
effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate."

Id.

at 5-6.
After considering temporal proximity, the Court
considered "the purpose and flagrancy of the police conduct."
Id. at 6.

In analyzing this prong, the Court indicated that "the

police purposely conducted a roadblock without justifiable
reasons" and the 'goal of conducting the roadblock was "to stop
cars and look for any criminal activity" and to obtain consent to
search vehicles.

Id. at 7.

The Court reasoned that any

incentive to seize on the ambiguity in the law regarding
roadblocks and use that violation to obtain consent to search
must "be removed by excluding evidence obtained thereby."

Id.

at 8 .
Finally, the Court determined that there were no
intervening circumstances which attenuated the illegal stop from
the consent.

Id. at 8.

The Court indicated that intervening

circumstances can include fleeing or "the independent discovery
of additional inculpatory evidence giving the police probable
cause to arrest."

Id.

In the present case, the first factor--the temporal
21

proximity between the illegal search and the consent--indicates
exploitation.

As was the case in Shoulderblade, in the present

case, "the effects of the misconduct have not had time to
dissipate."

Id. at 6.

The AP&P agents arrived at Flower's residence at about
2:30 p.m. (R. 191, 193, 231), with the illegal protective sweep
taking place shortly thereafter and lasting approximately ten
minutes.

R. 193.

The agents were still present over two and

one-half hours later when Flower arrived home around 5:15 p.m.
R. 222, 258.

They immediately questioned Flower regarding the

contents of the safe.

R. 258, 260.

Immediately thereafter, Agent Metcalf conducted an
illegal search of Flower's lunch box and then placed him under
arrest.

R. 225, 262-63.

The officers took Flower into the

kitchen portion of his house where he again was asked whether he
would agree to a search of the safe.

R.142, 226.

Both the

initial and subsequent affirmative responses that the officers
could search the safe were given in close temporal proximity to
the illegal sweep and illegal search of the lunch box.
In addition, both affirmative responses were given during
an ongoing official illegality.

Therefore, regardless of the

actual lapse of time, no time factor actually separated the
illegality from the consent.

See State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d

652, 656 (Utah App. 1992); see also United States v. PerezCastro, 606 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1979) (inculpatory statements on
the morning following illegal arrest were not sufficiently
22

attenuated).

In Brown, the Supreme Court found a two-hour lapse

in time between the initial illegality and the consent was not
sufficient to show attenuation.

See also People v. Koniecki, 481

N.E.2d 973, 980 (111. App. 1985) (consent obtained within two
hours of illegal search and one hour of illegal arrest was not
attenuated from illegality).
The absence of any intervening circumstances also
indicates that the officers exploited the illegality.

During the

two hours and thirty-five minutes between the illegal protective
sweep and the first consent to search the safe, the four AP&P
agents waited at Flower's residence for his arrival home from
work.

No intervening circumstances occurred which would

attenuate the consent from the illegal search.
Nor were there independent intervening circumstances
between the illegal protective sweep and illegal search of the
lunch pail and the second consent.

Officers initially questioned

Flower about the scales, marijuana residue and contents of the
safe as the result of the illegal sweep.

This initial

questioning led directly to Flower's initial affirmative response
that officers could open the safe.

The illegal search of the

lunch box followed and led directly to the illegal arrest and
subsequent affirmative response.

No independent circumstances

intervened to break the chain of events from the illegal search
of the lunch box or earlier illegal sweep.
The lack of intervening circumstances in this case
contrasts with the existence of intervening circumstances in
23

Thurman.

See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1274.

Unlike the situation in

Thurman, the intimidation and confusion had not abated when
officers asked to search the safe in this case.

Indeed, the

request was made almost immediately after Flower arrived.

Flower

was not advised of his Miranda rights before the first "consent."
He was handcuffed and had exercised his right to silence when
officers requested that he consent to a search.

In addition,

Flower did not volunteer to allow the agents to search the safe;
instead, the agents requested that Flower consent to a search.
Flower's "consent" to search the safe arose from an
unbroken chain of events which began with the illegal sweep of
the house.

Had the officers not seen the scales and residue,

they would not have initially confronted Flower as they did.

Nor

would they have remained at the home for over two hours waiting
for Flower to return.

Under these circumstances, no intervening

circumstances served to dissipate the taint of the illegal
searches.
The final factor to be examined is the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct.

This "purpose and

flagrancy" factor bears directly on the deterrent value of
suppression.

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263.

While the agents

claimed that the purpose of the ad hoc protective sweep of
Flower's residence was to determine whether or not there were
third persons in the home who might pose a threat to the AP&P
agents' safety, it appears that the agents were also looking for
any evidence which they could use against Kelly or anyone else in
24

the house.
The agents waited for Flower in an attempt to gain
further evidence.

They then searched his lunch box in an attempt

to find more incriminating evidence.

Both the illegal search of

Flower's room and the illegal search of the lunch box appear to
have been an effort to facilitate a search for evidence and
deprive Flower of his rights.
The officers purposely searched the room and later
purposely searched the lunch box.

The circumstances are similar

to those in Shoulderblade in that the officers conducted the
searches "without justifiable reasons."

See Id. at 7.

The

officers' actions while at Flower's home indicate that the
purpose of their conduct was to obtain consent or otherwise
search the home.

The incentive in this case to violate the

Fourth Amendment "is precisely the type of incentive that must be
removed by excluding evidence obtained."

Id. at 7-8.

The four agents were well trained and should have known
that their actions were not authorized by law.

"'The greatest

dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.'"

State v. Sims, 808

P.2d 141, 151 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)).
All three of the Arroyo/Thurman/Shoulderblade factors
indicate that the officers obtained consent in this case by
exploiting the illegality.

The State failed to establish that
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the taint of the illegality was purged.

The contents of the safe

must therefore be suppressed.

REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED
AND OPINION ISSUED
The issues raised in this case further refine the
analysis for determining whether a consent to search is voluntary
and attenuated from the initial illegality, as required by State
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993),

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this

(stL

day of November, 1995.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

MATTHEW G. NIELSEN
/
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
November, 1995.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED this

day of November, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A

Art. I, § 14

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Controlled Substances Act, search warrants, § 58-37-10.

Liquor, search, seizure
§ 32A-13-103.

and

forfeiture,

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED
STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

CaseNo.921901772FS
GROVE L. FLOWER,
Judge John A. Rokich
Defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. On or about September 14, 1992, Adult Probation and Parole Agent
Arthur Street received a complaint that a parolee by the name of Kevin Kelley had been
involved in an aggravated sexual assault. Mr. Street contacted Keliey's parole officer
Steve Metcalf and they decided to go to Mr. Keliey's address to conduct a home visit.
Agents Street and Metcalf were joined by Agents Hauraund and Kennington who had
previously supervised Kelley while he was on parole.
2. Agents Hauraund and Kennington had conducted a previous home visit
with parolee Kelley on February 24, 1992. At the beginning of this home visit Kelley
was asked by the agents if anyone else was in the house. Kelley denied having anyone in
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the house with him. The agents heard noises from a back bedroom and discovered a man
hiding in the back bedroom. This incident was resolved without any violence.
3.

Parolee Kelley had a past history of violent criminal behavior including

aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault charges. Kennington, Hauraund, Metcalf
and Street knew that Kelley had hidden a person at his residence before and had lied
about the person to the parole agents, they also knew that Kelley had a past record of
violence. Kelley's parole agreement provided that the agents could search his residence if
they had reasonable suspicion that a probation violation had been committed by Kelley.
4.

Parolee Kelley had reported to the Parole Department that the only

persons living at his residence at 4256 South 4940 West was his wife, Donna Kelley. The
agents had no knowledge on September 14, 1992, that any other persons lived in the
house.
4(a). In actuality, Kelley was renting a room from Grove Flower.
5. The Parole Agents went to Kelley's house at 4256 South 4940 West in
Salt Lake County on September 14, 1992. Upon arrival Agents Metcalf and Street
approached the front door while agents Hauraund and Kennington went around back to
prevent anyone from leaving through a back exit.
6.

While in the back of the residence agents Hauraund and Kennington

noticed a Pit Bull Terrier on the back yard of the residence. The Pit Bull would run to the
back door. The Pit Bull did this several times causing Agents Kennington and Hauraund
to believe that someone may have been in the house. Agents Street and Metcalf had
knocked on the front door of the house and had received no response.
7. Kelley arrived at the house a few minutes after the agents had knocked
on the door. Kelley had obviously been in a physical confrontation, he had a black eye
and a laceration on the back of his head. The agents identified themselves and the reason
for their visit. Kelley asked if they could talk about this inside the house away from the
view of the neighbors and invited the agents inside the house. When the agents and
2
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view of the neighbors and invited the agents inside the house. When the agents and
Kelley arrived at the front door the agents asked Kelley if anyone was in the house and he
indicated he didn?t think so but that he was not sure.
8. Agents Kennington and Metcalf accompanied Kelley upstairs while
Agents Street and Hauraund testified that they proceeded downstairs to conduct a
protective sweep. They did not discuss the protective sweep among themselves.
9. During the protective sweep Agent Street observed a set of scales with
marijuana residue on them and a gun locker with marijuana residue in front of it in the
downstairs south east corner bedroom. Agent Hauraund had not observed the residue or
scales in his sweep of the room and closet. Agent Street entered the bedroom after Agent
Hauraund had already looked in the room.

Agent Hauraund observed a box of

ammunition in the kitchen area upstairs.
10. After the protective sweep was finished the agents asked Kelley who
was using the Southeast basement bedroom. He replied that it was used by Grove
Flower. The agents made telephone calls about obtaining a search warrant.
11. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Grove Flower was dropped off at the
residence by a vehicle. Agents Street and Metcalf were on the porch when Flower arrived
home. They met Flower on the front yard and identified themselves and explained the
reason for their visit.
12. Agent Metcalf told Mr. Flower about finding the safe, scales and
marijuana residue and mentioned "I sure would like to know what's in the safe." Mr.
Flower responded by saying I'll tell you there is an eighth ounce of marijuana and some
guns in the safe. Agent Metcalf asked permission to search inside the safe and Flower
gave him permission to search.
13. Given the fact that Flower had indicated that he owned firearms Agent
Metcalf determined to do a Terry frisk on Flower. During the Terry frisk Flower set
down a lunch pail on the hood of Kelleyfs truck. After setting the lunch pail down
3
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Flower's son attempted to take the lunch box and Flower grabbed the lunch box in a
protective fashion. Agent Metcalf took the lunch box and Flower stated "It's pot man."
At that time Metcalf opened the lunch box and discovered it to contain one-half pound of
marijuana.
14. Flower was placed under arrest and was taken into the house. Where he
was Mirandized. Flower invoked his Miranda Rights. Flower was asked if he would
consent to a search of his safe, he gave his consent and reached into his pocket to retrieve
a key to the safe. The agents terminated their efforts to obtain a search warrant.
15. When the safe was opened two firearms, one-eighth ounce marijuana,
psylocybin mushrooms, money and a ledger were found.
From the foregoing Findings of Facts the Court makes the following
conclusion of law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court finds that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to

believe that there was another individual in the house which posed a danger to them and
therefore the protective sweep was not justified. The scales and marijuana fragments
found during the protective sweep are suppressed.
2.

The officers search of the defendant's lunch box was not a valid Terry

search nor was it a valid search incident to arrest. The contents of the lunch box are
suppressed.
3.

The initial consent given by the defendant to search the safe when he

was contacted in the front yard of the house was sufficiently attenuated from the
protective sweep and was voluntary. The subsequent consent given by the defendant after
his arrest and after his Miranda rights had been given to him was attenuated from the
protective sweep and was voluntary. The search of the safe was a valid consent search
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and the contents of the safe are not suppressed.
DATED this /(J

day of Aid t cL^

, 1994.

BY THE COURT

I The Honorable John A. Rokich
*e of The Third District Court
Approved as to form:

h*t»,_vw

Counsel for Defendant
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2001 South State Street, S3700
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

CaseNo.921901772FS
GROVE L. FLOWER,

:
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.

:

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and good
cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The scales and marijuana fragments found during the protective sweep

are suppressed;
2.

The marijuana found in the lunch box is suppressed;

3.

The firearms, marijuana, psylocybin mushrooms, money and ledger

found in the safe are not suppressed.
DATED this J^_ day of

frlfrKCH

1994.

BY THE COURT:

Tha Honorable John a. Rokich
^Juage of The Third District Court
ts ^ * - i * ^ i ; < ^ U ;
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CERTIFICATE OF MATT TNG
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order, was mailed, postage prepaid and
addressed as follows:
Robert B. Breeze
Attorney at law
211 East 300 South, #215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this P<** day ofJaauafy, 1994.
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